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MAKING THE RULES OF SPORTS FAIRER∗1
STEVEN J. BRAMS† AND MEHMET S. ISMAIL‡2
Abstract. The rules of many sports are not fair—they do not ensure that equally skilled3
competitors have the same probability of winning. As an example, the penalty shootout in soccer,4
wherein a coin toss determines which team kicks first on all five penalty kicks, gives a substantial5
advantage to the first-kicking team, both in theory and practice. We show that a so-called Catch-6
Up Rule for determining the order of kicking would not only make the shootout fairer but also7
is essentially strategyproof. By contrast, the so-called Standard Rule now used for the tiebreaker8
in tennis is fair. We briefly consider several other sports, all of which involve scoring a sufficient9
number of points to win, and show how they could benefit from certain rule changes, which would10
be straightforward to implement.11
Key words. Sports rules, fairness, strategyproofness, Markov process, soccer, tennis12
AMS subject classifications. 60J20, 91A80, 91A0513
1. Introduction. In this paper, we show that the rules for competition in some14
sports are not fair. By “fair,” we mean that they give equally skilled competitors the15
same chance to win—figuratively, they level the playing field. Later we will be more16
precise in defining “fairness.”17
We first consider knockout (elimination) tournaments in soccer (i.e., football,18
except in North America), wherein one team must win. We show that when a tied19
game goes to a penalty shootout, the rules are not fair. On the other hand, the20
tiebreak in tennis tournaments, when a set is tied at six games apiece, is fair. We21
briefly comment on the fairness of the rules in other sports, including three racquet22
sports and volleyball.23
But more than pointing a finger at sports whose rules favor one competitor,24
we analyze in detail two rules—one old (Win-by-Two Rule) and one new (Catch-25
Up Rule)—and consider other rules as well that can ameliorate unfairness in some26
sports. As we will show, the lack of fairness arises not because the present rules27
are inherently unfair, always favoring one player, but rather because they involve an28
element of chance, such as29
• which team wins the coin toss in a penalty shootout in soccer and almost30
invariably elects to kick first;31
• which team initially serves in volleyball, in which the team to score 25 points32
first and be ahead by a margin of at least two points, wins.33
We use ideas from fair division and game theory. In game theory, a game is defined34
by “the totality of the rules that describe it” [18]. (Wittman [19] offers an intriguing35
discussion of “efficient rules,” which are often used as substitutes for economic markets36
in sports and other activities.) In almost all competitive sports, the rules allow for37
some element of chance, such as who gets to move first. In the final round of a golf38
tournament, it is in fact the players who get to play last—the order is not fixed by39
the rules—who know what they must score to win. This knowledge may help them40
decide whether to try a risky shot or not, which is information the first players to41
finish do not have.42
∗Authors received no financial support for research on this paper.
†Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10012, USA
(steven.brams@nyu.edu).
‡Department of Economics, Maastricht University, PO Box 616 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Nether-
lands (mehmet.s.ismail@gmail.com).
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In the National Football League, if a game ends in a tie, a coin toss determines43
which team decides whether to kick or receive in the overtime period. Almost always,44
the winner of the coin toss elects to receive, which statistics indicate gives it a sub-45
stantial advantage of winning the game. Che and Hendershott [7, 8] proposed that46
the teams bid on the yard line that would make them indifferent between kicking and47
receiving; Brams and Sanderson [6] and Granot and Gerschak [11] further analyzed48
this rule and discussed the extension of bidding to soccer and chess to render compe-49
tition fairer. In this paper, we propose very different solutions to the fairness problem50
in sports when bidding may be deemed infeasible or unacceptable.51
Handicaps are sometimes used in these situations to make contests more compet-
itive. In golf, for example, if A has a handicap of four strokes and B has a handicap
of two strokes, then A, with a score of 80, can beat B, with a score of 79 (lower scores
win in golf), because
80− 4 = 76 < 79− 2 = 77.
That is, when the handicaps are subtracted to give net scores, B beats A 76 to 77.52
Thereby the handicaps turn B from a loser into a winner.53
Handicaps in sports take different forms. In horse racing, horses may carry ad-54
ditional weight according to their speed in past performances, with the fastest horse55
carrying the most weight (other factors also matter, such as post position and the56
jockey). Handicapping is also done by starting horses at different points, with the57
fastest horse having the greatest distance to run in order to win.58
In general, handicapping gives an advantage to weaker competitors—as compen-59
sation for their lower level of skill—to equalize the chances that all competitors can60
win. Handicapping is used in a variety of sports and games, including bowling, chess,61
Go, sailboat racing, baseball, basketball, football (American), and track and field62
events, where it serves as the basis for wagering on the outcomes of these contests.63
Thus, a weak player or team can beat a strong one if the point spread that the strong64
one must win by is sufficiently large.65
In the subsequent analysis, we consider competitions in which handicapping may66
not be feasible or desirable. Instead, handicapping, if any, occurs in the course of play.67
More specifically, the Catch-Up Rule takes into account the results of competition in68
the preceding contest: Players or teams that do worse in the preceding contest are69
afforded the opportunity to catch up. (This idea is incorporated in a game, Catch-70
Up, which is analyzed in Isaksen, Ismail, Brams, and Nealen [12]. For a demo version71
of this game, see http://game.engineering.nyu.edu/projects/catch-up/.) Greater fair-72
ness can also be engendered by the Win-by-Two Rule, which precludes a player or73
team from winning by just one point and can minimize, or even eliminate, the role of74
chance.75
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the Catch-Up Rule and76
a related rule, the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule, and apply them to penalty77
kicks in soccer, the world’s most widely played and popular sport. In Section 3, we78
show how these rules tend to equalize the probability of each side winning, compared79
with what we call the Standard Rule, based on a coin toss. The Standard Rule,80
which varies from sport to sport, determines in soccer which team kicks first on every81
round of the penalty shootout. This rule gives the team that wins the coin toss, and82
generally chooses to kick first, a decided edge.83
In Section 4, we consider the situation when, after five penalty kicks, the teams84
remain tied. Then the outcome is determined by a form of sudden death, whereby85
the first team to score a goal on a round without the other team scoring, wins.86
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In this infinite-horizon situation (there is no definite termination), we analyze the87
probability of each side winning under the Standard Rule, the Catch-Up Rule, and88
the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule in situations when teams are equally skilled89
and when they are not. We also consider the incentive that a team might have to90
try to manipulate the outcome by not making a maximal effort to win a point, either91
when it kicks or when its opponent kicks, and show that, for all practical purposes,92
the Catch-Up Rule is incentive compatible or strategyproof.93
In Section 5, we turn to tennis, one of the most popular two-person sports, showing94
that the Standard Rule in the tiebreak, when a set is tied at six games apiece, is fair,95
primarily because of the alternation in serving and the Win-by-Two rule. In Section96
6, we briefly consider other sports and games and comment on the fairness of their97
rules. In Section 7, we offer some concluding thoughts on the practicality of changing98
the rules of sports to render them fairer.99
2. The Catch-Up Rule, the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule, and100
Their Application to Soccer. Suppose that a soccer game, after regulation play101
and sometimes extra-time periods, ends in a tie. Because soccer is a low-scoring102
game, ties, which may be as low as 0-0, are common. To break ties in a knockout103
tournament, there is a penalty-kick shootout, whereby a different player from each104
team, over five rounds, is given the chance to score a goal from 11 meters in front of105
the goal line, which is defended by the other team’s goal-keeper.106
The team that scores more goals in the shootout wins. If the scores are tied at the107
end of the five rounds of the shootout, then the game goes to sudden death. If one team108
(say, A) gains an insurmountable lead over the other (B), the shootout terminates109
early: Even if B scores on all the remaining rounds and A does not, A would still110
win. In particular, if A leads 3-0 or 4-2 in the shootout, there is no possibility that B111
can win or tie, even if it scores and A does not score on the remaining rounds.112
The reason for having five rounds in penalty shootouts is to ensure, insofar as113
seems reasonable, that the stronger team wins with a high probability. If play were114
immediately to go to sudden death, luck would play an unduly large role, making115
it more chance than skill that one team happens to score, and the other does not,116
on a single round. But over five rounds there is less variance in the probability that117
the better team will win. But “better” in this case means a team’s ability, in several118
two-person competitions between a kicker and a defender, to score and to prevent the119
other team from scoring. This ability, however, may have little relationship to the120
ability of an 11-person team to win in regular play, which is why penalty shootouts121
are unpopular with many fans.122
Which team kicks first on each of the five rounds of kicks, when each team has one123
kick, is determined by a coin toss. This is the Standard Rule in penalty shootouts.124
The team that wins the toss almost always elects to kick first, because doing so is125
generally considered advantageous. It puts psychological pressure on the team that126
kicks second, especially if the team kicking first scores on its kick [15].127
In major tournaments between 1970 and 2013, the team that kicked first won the128
penalty shootout 60.6% of the time [15], giving it a substantial 3:2 advantage, or 50%129
greater probability, of winning the tied game. Earlier Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta130
[2] found a 60.5% first-mover advantage, using a dataset of 269 shootouts from 1970131
to 2008; later, Kocher, Lenz and Sutter [14] observed a 53.3% advantage, using a132
dataset of 540 shootouts from 1970 to 2003. The dataset reported in [15] used 1001133
shootouts from 1970 to 2013. When coaches and players were asked in a survey about134
whether they would choose to go first or second if they won the coin toss, more than135
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90% said they would go first [2]. Clearly, the advantage of kicking first is not only136
perceived, but it is, in fact, large.137
A partial solution to the first-kicker bias would be to use a coin toss on each round138
of the penalty shootout to determine the order of kicking. Like the present rule, this139
would be ex ante but not ex post fair. For example, a team that wins three tosses in140
a row, which is not a rare event, would get a nice break from this rule, whereas our141
Catch-Up Rule, as discussed next, would halt a string of successes because of such a142
break.143
2.1. Catch-Up Rule. The Catch-Up Rule is designed to mitigate this bias. To144
make it applicable to sports other than soccer, we formulate it below for all sports145
with multiple contests.146
More specifically, we assume there is a series of contests (penalty kicks in soccer)147
in which, in each contest, there is an advantaged and a disadvantaged player or team148
(the advantaged team in soccer is the team that kicks first in a round). If a player or149
team wins a contest, call it W ; if it loses, call it L. When no player or team wins or150
loses a contest, call the contest unresolved (U ). Play proceeds as follows.151
1. In the first contest, a coin is tossed to determine which player or team is152
advantaged and which is disadvantaged.153
2. In this contest and every subsequent contest in which one player or team be-154
comes W and the other L, the player or team that was L becomes advantaged155
in the next contest.156
3. If a contest is U because both teams become L or both become W, the player157
or team that was advantaged in it becomes the other player or team in the158
next contest.159
In soccer, the contests are rounds, in which each team has one kick. In the first160
round, one team is advantaged (by kicking first). If it is successful (W ) and the other161
team is not (L), rule 2 says that L becomes advantaged on the next round (whether162
it was advantaged or disadvantaged in the current round). If both teams on a round163
are either successful or unsuccessful in scoring a point, neither team becomes L or164
W —the contest is U. Rule 3 says that the team that was advantaged in a U round165
becomes disadvantaged in the next round.166
Let the two teams in soccer be X and Y. In the first round, assume that X wins167
the coin toss and, therefore, is advantaged. If the contest turns out to be U, Y will168
be advantaged on the next round; Y will also be advantaged if X wins on the first169
round. Only if X loses and Y wins on the first round will X be advantaged in the170
next round.171
In the subsequent analysis, we assume that X wins the coin toss, so it kicks first.172
To illustrate our analysis in a simple case, assume that there are just two rounds in173
the penalty shootout, allowing X and Y two kicks each.174
In Figure 1, we illustrate all the possible states of a two-round penalty shootout,175
wherein the order in which we write X and Y indicates which team shoots first, and176
which second, according to the Catch-Up Rule (e.g., XY indicates that X shoots177
first and Y second). The numbers in parentheses, (I-J ), give the scores of X and Y,178
respectively, in that state. The first-round states are unshaded and the second-round179
states are shaded.180
The shootout starts in the center, XY (0-0), in which X kicks first, Y second,181
and the score is 0-0. There are four cases of continuation, whereby in the first round182
X and Y both score (++), X scores and Y does not (+−), X does not score and Y183
does (−+), and neither players scores (−−). Arrows point to these four states from184
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Fig. 1. Possible States of Catch-Up over Two Rounds in the Penalty Shootout
XY (0-0).185
Emanating from each of these four states are four more arrows, pointing to four186
shaded states, which constitute the second round, in which both, one, or neither team187
scores. Observe that if both teams score on both rounds, play ends at XY (2-2) in188
the lower right shaded state, in which X kicks first because Y did at YX (1-1). This189
order also holds at XY (0-0) in the upper left, in which neither player scores on both190
rounds.191
Before reaching either of these two shaded states, the order of kicking switches192
to YX —at YX (1,1) in the first case, and YX (0,0) in the second case. Only when X193
fails to score and Y does score at XY (0-1) in the first round does the order of kicking194
not switch (it stays XY ), because by rule 2 X is still advantaged since it did not score195
when Y did.196
2.2. Behind First, Alternating Order Rule. The Catch-Up Rule differs from197
the “behind first, alternating order” mechanism of Anbarci et al. [1], which depends198
on the current score: If one team is behind, it kicks first on the next round; if the199
score is tied, the order of kicking alternates (i.e., switches from the previous round).200
By comparison, the Catch-Up Rule depends only on the performances of the teams201
on the previous round.202
To illustrate the difference between the two mechanisms, suppose that X is ahead203
by one point. Under the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule, Y will be advantaged204
next since it is behind. But under the Catch-Up Rule, X could be advantaged next.205
(For example, if Y was previously behind by two points and reduced the deficit to one206
point by scoring when X did not, then X would be advantaged next, even though Y207
is still behind.) Thereby, the Catch-Up Rule allows for the possibility that a player208
who is ahead will be advantaged; it does not automatically confer an advantage on209
the player who is behind, as does the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule.210
There are other differences between the two mechanisms. Anbarci et al. [1]211
model the optimal spot for the kicker to aim at to balance the probability of the212
goalie stopping a goal (if the ball is aimed close to the center of the net) and the213
probability of the ball going outside the net (if the ball is aimed close to a post on the214
side). By contrast, we offer no such model but assume instead that the probability215
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of a successful kick depends only on whether the kicker kicks first or second on a216
round, implicitly assuming that where to aim has been optimally chosen and not217
modeling this aspect of the game. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption in218
the penalty shootout, especially because each kicker gets only one try. We spell out219
later the Markovian decision process that the Catch-Up Rule assumes, but first we220
define some terms we will employ in our probabilistic analysis.221
3. Probabilistic Analysis of the Penalty Shootout. Let pZi ∈ [0, 1] be the222
probability that team Z (X or Y ) is successful if its kicker on round i (i = 1, 2, ...)223
kicks first, and qZi ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that its kicker on round i is successful if224
it kicks second, where kicks by each team are assumed to be independent events. We225
omit the superscripts (subscripts) when we suppose that the scoring probability of a226
player is independent of the team (round).227
Let P r(X) denote the probability of X winning (by at least one point), P r(Y ) the228
probability of Y winning, and P r(T ) the probability of a tie (T ) over r rounds. We229
calculate separately these probabilities under the Standard Rule and the Catch-Up230
Rule.231
3.1. Standard Rule. Under this rule, because X won the coin toss, it kicks first232
on every round. To illustrate, when r = 2, X can win with scores of 2-0, 2-1, or 1-0,233
whose three probabilities, respectively, are given by the three bracketed expressions234
below:235
P 2(X) = [pX1 (1− qY1 )pX2 (1− qY2 )] + [pX1 (1− qY1 )pX2 qY2 + pX1 qY1 pX2 (1− qY2 )]236
237
+[pX1 (1− qY1 )(1− pX2 )(1− qY2 ) + (1− pX1 )(1− qY1 )pX2 (1− qY2 )].238
The first summand in brackets gives the probability that X scores and Y does not239
on both rounds. In the second summand, X scores on both rounds but Y does not240
on one round (either the first or the second). In the third summand, X scores on one241
round (either the first or the second) but Y does not on both rounds.242
Analogously, by interchanging (pX1 , p
X
2 ) and (q
Y
1 , q
Y
2 ) in the formula for P
2(X),243
Y can win with scores of 0-2, 1-2, and 0-1, given by the three bracketed expressions244
below:245
P 2(Y ) = [(1− pX1 )qY1 (1− pX2 )qY2 ] + [(1− pX1 )qY1 pX2 qY2 + pX1 qY1 (1− pX2 )qY2 ]246
247
+[(1− pX1 )qY1 (1− pX2 )(1− qY2 ) + (1− pX1 )(1− qY1 )(1− pX2 )qY2 ].248
Finally, the probability of a tie (T ), which may be 0-0, 1-1, or 2-2, is given,249
respectively, by the three probabilities in the three bracketed expressions below:250
P 2(T ) = [(1− pX1 )(1− qY1 )(1− pX2 )(1− qY2 )] + [pX1 qY1 (1− pX2 )(1− qY2 )251
252
+pX1 (1− qY1 )(1− pX2 )qY2 + (1− pX1 )qY1 pX2 (1− qY2 ) + (1− pX1 )(1− qY1 )pX2 qY2 ]253
254
+[(pX1 q
Y
1 p
X
2 q
Y
2 ].255
The first and third expressions give the probabilities, respectively, that both players256
do not score, or do score, on both rounds. The second expression reflects the fact257
that X and Y can each score, or not score, one point on either the first or the second258
round, giving 2× 2 = 4 different ways in which a 1-1 tie can be achieved. As a check259
on these formulas, one can verify that260
P 2(X) + P 2(Y ) + P 2(T ) = 1.261
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To illustrate the advantage that the Standard Rule confers on X, assume pX1 =262
pX2 = 3/4 and p
Y
1 = p
Y
2 = 2/3, favoring X on each round by the ratio (3/4)/(2/3),263
which gives X a 9:8 advantage, or a 1/8 = 12.5% greater probability than Y of winning264
on each round. Over the two rounds, this advantage is significantly magnified:265
(1) P 2(X) =
51
144
= 0.354; P 2(Y ) =
32
144
= 0.222; P 2(T ) =
61
144
= 0.424.266
The first two probabilities give X a 51:32 advantage, or a 19/32 = 59.4% greater267
probability than Y, of winning. Notice, however, that P 2(T ) is the biggest of the three268
probabilities; we will show later how sudden death, when there is a tie, reallocates269
this probability to P 2(X) and P 2(Y ).270
The following proposition gives formulas for the three probabilities when the271
kickers of X and Y are equally skilled, so p and q depend only on whether X or Y272
kicks first or second on a round—not the player for X or Y who kicks on that round273
(i.e., p and q are not kicker-dependent).274
Proposition 3.1. Assume there are r rounds, on each of which the advantaged275
team (first kicker) has probability p of scoring and the disadvantaged team (second276
kicker) has probability q of scoring. If X kicks first,277
P r(X) =
r−1∑
i=0
r−i−1∑
j=0
(
r
r − i
)(
r
j
)
pr−j(1− p)iqj(1− q)r−j ,278
279
P r(Y ) =
r−1∑
i=0
r−i−1∑
j=0
(
r
r − i
)(
r
j
)
qr−j(1− q)ipj(1− p)r−j ,280
281
P r(T ) =
r∑
j=0
(
r
j
)(
r
j
)
pj(1− p)r−jqj(1− q)r−j .282
Proof. The number of ways in which X can win by scoring on m out of the r283
rounds is the number of ways in which Y ’s score is less than m, which is
(
r
m
)(
r
m−i
)
284
for all values of 1 < m ≤ r and 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The double summation on the left side of285
P r(X) gives all ways in which X can beat Y —1-0, 2-0, 2-1, ..., r-(r− 1)—multiplied286
by the corresponding probability for each of the ways. P r(Y ) interchanges p and q in287
the formula for P r(X). P r(T ) reflects the fact that X and Y obtain the same score,288
with the single summation over all ways in which this can occur.289
3.2. Catch-Up Rule. We next consider the effects of the Catch-Up Rule over290
two rounds of penalty kicks. X and Y can win, lose, or tie with the same scores291
as under the Standard Rule. But the ways these scores are realized are different:292
The ordering of kicking on each round is endogenous (i.e., dependent on the previous293
round) rather than exogenous (i.e., fixed in advance). We list below the three ways294
that X can win with scores of (i) 2-0, (ii) 2-1, and (iii) 1-0:295
(i) 2-0: X scores on both rounds while Y fails to score on both. On the first round, X296
succeeds and Y fails with probability pX1 (1−qY1 ). On the second round, Y kicks297
first and fails while X kicks second and succeeds with probability (1 − pY2 )qX2 .298
The joint probability of this outcome over both rounds is pX1 (1−qY1 )(1−pY2 )qX2 .299
(ii) 2-1: X scores on both rounds while Y fails to score on one of these rounds.300
There are two cases:301
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(a) Assume Y scores on the first round. On this round, both players succeed302
with probability pX1 q
Y
1 . On the second round, Y kicks first and fails, after303
which X succeeds, with probability (1− pY2 )qX2 . The joint probability over304
both rounds is pX1 q
Y
1 (1− pY2 )qX2 .305
(b) Assume Y scores on the second round. On the first round, X succeeds and306
Y fails with probability pX1 (1 − qY1 ). On the second round, Y kicks first307
and succeeds, after which X succeeds, with probability pY2 q
X
2 . The joint308
probability over both rounds is pX1 (1− qY1 )pY2 qX2 .309
Thus, the probability that the outcome is 2-1 is
pX1 q
Y
1 (1− pY2 )qX2 + pX1 (1− qY1 )pY2 qX2 .
(iii) 1-0: X scores on one round while Y fails to score on both rounds. There are two310
cases:311
(a) Assume X scores on the first round. On this round, X succeeds and Y fails312
with probability pX1 (1− qY1 ). On the second round, Y kicks first and fails,313
after which X fails, with probability (1−pY2 )(1−qX2 ). The joint probability314
over both rounds is pX1 (1− qY1 )(1− pY2 )(1− qX2 ).315
(b) Assume X scores on the second round. On the first round, both players316
fail with probability (1− pX1 )(1− qY1 ). On the second round, Y kicks first317
and fails, after which X succeeds, with probability (1 − pY2 )qX2 . The joint318
probability over both rounds is (1− pX1 )(1− qY1 )(1− pY2 )qX2 .319
Thus, the probability that the outcome is 1-0 is320
pX1 (1− qY1 )(1− pY2 )(1− qX2 ) + (1− pX1 )(1− qY1 )(1− pY2 )qX2 .321
Summing the probabilities that X wins in cases (i), (ii), and (iii), given by each322
of the summands in brackets below, yields323
P 2(X) = [pX1 (1− qY1 )(1− pY2 )qX2 ] + [pX1 qY1 (1− pY2 )qX2 + pX1 (1− qY1 )pY2 qX2 ]324
325
+[pX1 (1− qY1 )(1− pY2 )(1− qX2 ) + (1− pX1 )(1− qY1 )(1− pY2 )qX2 .]326
An analogous for formula for P 2(Y ) for cases (i), (ii), and (iii), given by each of the327
summands, yields328
P 2(Y ) = [(1− pX1 )qY1 (1− pX2 )qY2 ] + [pX1 qY1 pY2 (1− qX2 ) + (1− pX1 )qY1 pX2 qY2 ]329
330
+[(1− pX1 )qY1 (1− pX2 )(1− qY2 ) + (1− pX1 )(1− qY1 )pY2 (1− qX2 )],331
and, as with the Standard Rule, P 2(T ) = 1− P 2(X)− P 2(Y ).332
For the values of p = 3/4 and q = 2/3 assumed earlier, we obtain333
(2) P 2(X) =
41
144
= 0.284; P 2(Y ) =
39
144
= 0.270; P 2(T ) =
64
144
= 0.444.334
Comparing the values of (1) and (2), we see that the Catch-Up Rule tends to equalize335
the values of P 2(X) and P 2(Y ) over those given by the Standard Rule. More specif-336
ically, X is favored in 2/39 = 5.1% more cases than Y, whereas recall that under the337
Standard Rule X was favored in 59.4% more cases than Y. Thus, the Catch-Up Rule338
cuts the bias in favor of X by a factor of more than ten.339
How does the number of rounds affect the advantage of X over Y ? Consider,340
for example, the trivial case for one round when p = 3/4 and q = 2/3, in which the341
Standard Rule and the Catch-Up Rule give the same probabilities,342
P 1(X) = p(1− q) = 0.250; P 1(Y ) = (1− p)q = 0.167; P 1(T ) = 0.583,343
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because, without a second round, the Catch-Up Rule cannot change the order of344
kicking from that of the Standard Rule.345
As the number of rounds increases from one to five, we have calculated P r(X),346
P r(Y ), and P r(T ) for the Standard Rule, the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule,347
and the Catch-Up Rule. (Recall from Section 2 that the Behind First, Alternating348
Order Rule is that if a team is behind in scoring, it will be advantaged—whether or349
not it was on the previous round—but if there is a tie, the team previously advantaged350
switches to the other team. This rule may be thought of as score-dependent, whereas351
the Catch-Up Rule is performance-dependent: The advantaged team is the one which352
lost on the previous round—independent of the score, so the history of play prior to353
the previous round is irrelevant—but if both teams score or do not on a round, the354
advantaged team switches from the previous round.) We have written a computer355
program to iterate the process to five rounds for the calculation given below.356
It is worth pointing out that our probabilistic calculations are not affected if a357
shootout ends early—before five rounds are completed—should one team attain an358
insurmountable lead (see Section 2). This is so because a victory that occurs before359
the completion of five rounds would be a victory after the completion of five rounds360
and, consequently, would have the same probability of occurrence.361
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta [2, p. 2558] present empirical probabilities, based362
on a dataset of 269 penalty shootouts, that X and Y lead at the end of r rounds,363
with r ranging from round 1 to round 5,364
[P r(X), P r(Y )]5i=1 = [(0.20, 0.13), (0.27, 0.20), (0.35, 0.23), (0.40, 0.27), (0.46, 0.27)],365
in which each pair in the five-element sequence gives the probability of the first-kicking366
team (X) and the second-kicking (Y ) team, respectively, winning on that round. The367
probability of a tie at the end of each round is the complement of these probabilities368
(e.g., at the end of round 5, the probability of a tie is 1− (0.46 + 0.27) = 0.27).369
Our starting point is the empirical probabilities that X and Y, respectively, score370
a point on each of rounds 1 through 5, as given by the following sequence pairs [2, p.371
2558]:372
[pi, qi]
5
i=1 = [(0.79, 0.72), (0.82, 0.77), (0.77, 0.64), (0.74, 0.68), (0.74, 0.67)].373
These probabilities differ from the empirical probabilities in the preceding paragraph,374
which were cumulative—they gave the probabilities that X and Y lead after each375
round instead of the probabilities that they score on each round.376
Let X ’s and Y ’s probabilities on each round be the empirical probabilities given377
by [pi, qi]
5
i=1. The theoretical results for shootouts lasting from one to five rounds are378
shown in Table 1.379
As the number of rounds r increases from 1 to 5, we summarize below how the380
values of P r(T ), P r(X), and P r(Y ) change for the Standard Rule, the Behind First,381
Alternating Order Rule, and the Catch-Up Rule:382
1. P 5(X) and P 5(Y ) almost duplicate the empirical frequency with which X383
and Y lead at the end of round 5 under the Standard Rule [2, p. 2558].384
2. For all rules, P (T ) decreases by a factor of about 1.9 or more—from 0.628 to385
(i) 0.274 for the Standard Rule, (ii) 0.323 for the Behind First, Alternating386
Order Rule, and (iii) 0.289 for the Catch-Up Rule.387
3. For the Standard Rule, P (X) increases by a factor of 2.1 (0.466/0.221),388
whereas P (Y ) increases by a factor of 1.7 (0.260/0.151).389
4. For the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule P (X) increases by a factor of390
1.6 (0.364/0.221), whereas P (Y ) increases by a factor of 2.1 (0.313/0.151).391
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1 Round 2 Rounds 3 Rounds 4 Rounds 5 Rounds
P (X) 0.221 0.309 0.403 0.483 0.466
Standard Rule P (Y ) 0.151 0.210 0.228 0.250 0.260
P (T ) 0.628 0.481 0.369 0.312 0.274
Behind First P (X) 0.221 0.266 0.334 0.346 0.364
Alternating P (Y ) 0.151 0.241 0.256 0.299 0.313
Order Rule P (T ) 0.151 0.492 0.410 0.355 0.323
P (X) 0.221 0.266 0.353 0.362 0.385
Catch-Up Rule P (Y ) 0.151 0.241 0.270 0.310 0.326
P (T ) 0.628 0.492 0.377 0.328 0.289
Table 1
Probability That X Wins, Y Wins, or There Is a Tie after 1-5 Rounds for the Three Rules,
Based on the Empirical Probabilities Given by [pi, qi]
5
i=1
5. For the Catch-Up Rule, P (X) increases by a factor of 1.7 (0.385/0.221),392
whereas P (Y ) increases by a factor of 2.2 (0.326/0.151).393
Clearly, as P r(T ) decreases, P r(X) and P r(Y ) tend to diverge under the Standard394
Rule but converge under the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule and the Catch-Up395
Rule. More specifically, the latter two rules give Y the ability almost to catch up to396
X by giving it more opportunity to kick first, whereas the Standard Rule, by never397
allowing this, increases the disparity between the advantaged and the disadvantaged398
teams.399
In relative terms, the ratio, P (X)/P (Y ), is 1.5 on the first round for all three400
rules. While it increases to 1.8 for the Standard Rule after five rounds, it hovers401
around 1.2 for the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule and the Catch-Up Rule from402
rounds one to five. Hence, if there is more than one round, these two rules quickly403
reduce the big advantage that X enjoys over Y, whereas the Standard Rule increases404
X ’s advantage.405
We next calculate P r(X), P r(Y ), and P r(T ) in a penalty shootout in which the406
teams are differently skilled. We again start from the empirical probabilities that X407
and Y, respectively, score a point on each of rounds 1 through 5 given by [pi, qi]
5
i=1.408
Suppose that there is a good team (G) and a bad team (B). Let G’s probabilities409
on each round be the aforementioned empirical probabilities, and B’s probabilities be410
5 and 10 percentage points lower, respectively, than G’s:411
5% Lower : [(0.74, 0.67), (0.77, 0.72), (0.72, 0.59), (0.69, 0.63), (0.69, 0.62)]412
413
10% Lower : [(0.69, 0.62), (0.72, 0.67), (0.67, 0.54), (0.64, 0.58), (0.64, 0.57)].414
The results for penalty shootouts after five rounds, where G is either X (i.e., shoots415
first) or Y (shoots second), are shown in Table 2.416
We summarize below how the values of P 5(T ), P 5(X), and P 5(Y ) change for the417
Standard Rule, the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule, and the Catch-Up Rule:418
• Standard Rule: If G starts, P 5(X) is greater than P 5(Y ) by a factor of 2.6419
(0.540/0.210) in Case 1 (5%) and by a factor of 3.7 (0.609/0.166) in Case 2420
(10%). If G starts second, P 5(Y ) is about 7 percentage points lower (0.328421
vs. 0.398) than P 5(X) in Case 1—despite being the better team—and about422
6 percentage points higher (0.398 vs. 0.335) in Case 2.423
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G Is X against G Is Y against G Is X against G Is Y against
B (5% Lower) B (5% Lower) B (10% Lower) B (10% Lower)
P 5(X) 0.540 0.398 0.609 0.335
Standard Rule P 5(Y ) 0.210 0.328 0.166 0.398
P 5(T ) 0.251 0.274 0.224 0.267
Behind First P 5(X) 0.435 0.303 0.505 0.248
Alternating P 5(Y ) 0.258 0.384 0.209 0.456
Order Rule P 5(T ) 0.307 0.313 0.285 0.296
P 5(X) 0.458 0.322 0.528 0.265
Catch-Up Rule P 5(Y ) 0.269 0.399 0.219 0.471
P 5(T ) 0.273 0.280 0.253 0.264
Table 2
Probability That X Wins, Y Wins, or There Is a Tie after 5 Rounds When Teams Are Differ-
ently Skilled
• Behind First, Alternating Order Rule: If G starts first, P 5(X) is greater424
than P 5(Y ) by a factor of 1.7 (0.435/0.258) in Case 1 (5%) and by a factor of425
2.4 (0.505/0.209) in Case 2 (10%). If G starts second, P 5(Y ) is greater than426
P 5(X) by a factor of 1.3 in Case 1 and 1.8 in Case 2.427
• Catch-Up Rule: If G starts first, P 5(X) is greater than P 5(Y ) by a factor428
of 1.7 (0.435/0.258) in Case 1 (5%) and by a factor of 1.9 (0.505/0.259) in429
Case 2 (10%). If G starts second, P 5(Y ) is greater than P 5(X) by a factor430
of 1.2 (0.399/0.322) in Case 1 and by a factor of 1.8 (0.471/0.265) in Case 2.431
Clearly, both the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule and the Catch-Up Rule432
give a substantial boost to G, whether it is X or Y. The Standard Rule gives G even433
more of a boost if it is X, but if it is Y, G ’s skill may not be sufficiently high to434
overcome the disadvantage of being Y. These results are consistent with those given435
in Table 1, which showed that as the number of rounds increases for equally skilled436
teams, the Standard Rule widens the gap between being X or Y, whereas the Behind437
First, Alternating Order Rule and the Catch-Up Rule narrow it.438
After five rounds, as shown in Table 2, there is a substantial probability (25% to439
47%) that a penalty shootout will end in a tie. As we showed in Table 1, the range440
in the probability of a tie is narrower for equally skilled teams (27% to 39%) but still441
substantial. Because one must invoke sudden death to determine a winner in these442
cases, we turn next to their analysis and also consider the possibility of manipulation443
of the rules.444
4. Sudden Death and Strategic Manipulation in the Penalty Shootout.445
After five rounds of a shootout, the six states in which X and Y can be tied are 0-0,446
1-1, 2-2, 3-3, 4-4, or 5-5. When sudden death is applied to break a tie, the first team447
to score a point on a round when the other team does not become the winner.448
If there is a tie after five rounds, under the Standard Rule, X will kick first on449
every round until the tie is broken. X will win on round i with probability pXi (1−qYi );450
if it fails, it can still win subsequently if both players either score or do not score,451
which occurs with probability [pXi q
Y
i + (1− pXi )(1− qYi )].452
For simplicity of exposition, we omit the subscripts and superscripts from the453
subsequent probabilities. For both the Standard Rule and the Catch-Up Rule, let454
W (X) be the probability that X wins in sudden death; the probability that Y wins455
is the complement, W (Y ) = 1−W (X).456
For the Standard Rule (S ), X will win with probability WS(X), which gives the457
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1 Round 2 Rounds 3 Rounds 4 Rounds 5 Rounds
Standard Rule Q(X) 0.600 0.608 0.618 0.628 0.637
Catch-Up Rule Q(X) 0.526 0.516 0.518 0.513 0.514
Table 3
Probability That X Wins, with Sudden Death, after 1 to 5 Rounds when p = 3/4 and q = 2/3
for the Standard Rule and the Catch-Up Rule
following recursion:458
WS(X) = p(1− q) + [pq + (1− p)(1− q)]WS(X).459
Solving for WS(X) yields460
WS(X) =
p(1− q)
p+ q − 2pq .461
For the Catch-Up Rule, X will win on the first round with probability p(1− q); if462
that fails, it can win subsequently if both players either score or do not score, which463
occurs with probability [pq + (1 − p)(1 − q)]. Because the score remains tied, and464
X kicked first, by rule (3) of the Catch-Up Rule, Y will kick first next (see Section465
2). Y, now in the same position as X was at the outset, will win with the same466
probability, WC(X). Consequently, X will win with probability [1 −WC(X)]—that467
is, the probability Y will not win—which gives the following recursion:468
WC(X) = p(1− q) + [pq + (1− p)(1− q)][1−WC(X)].469
Solving for WC(X) yields470
WC(X) =
1− q + pq
2− p− q + 2pq .471
For p = 3/4 and q = 2/3, WS(X) = 3/5 = 0.600. Under the Catch-Up Rule, by472
contrast, WC(X) = 10/19 = 0.526, which is substantially closer to 50%, rendering473
X and Y more competitive. We forgo calculations for the Behind First, Alternating474
Order Rule, because this rule coincides with the Catch-Up Rule in sudden death.475
But these results hold only if the penalty shootout goes to sudden death. More476
likely, the shootout will be resolved by round five, or possibly on an earlier round if one477
team jumps ahead of the other in successful kicks. To foreclose the possibility of a tie478
in a knockout tournament, we use the sudden death formulas, WS(X) and WC(X),479
to apportion the tied probability, P r(T ), to P r(X) and P r(Y ), on each round r.480
For example, as we showed in Section 3, after two rounds, the probability of a tie481
under the Standard Rule is P 2(T ) = 61/144 = 0.424. Because WS(X) = 3/5 = 0.600482
and WS(Y ) = 2/5 = 0.400, X and Y ’s probabilities of winning with sudden death483
will be augmented by their apportioned tied probabilities—(61/144)(3/5) = 183/720484
= 0.254 for X and (61/144)(2/5) = 122/720 = 0.169 for Y —giving the following485
revised (rounded) probabilities of winning over two rounds that incorporate sudden486
death:487
Q2(X) = 0.354 + 0.254 = 0.608; Q2(Y ) = 0.222 + 0.169 = 0.392.488
These and the other probabilities for penalty shootouts lasting five or fewer489
rounds, where p = 3/4 and q = 2/3, are shown in Table 3 for Qr(X). Under the490
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Standard Rule, as r increases from 1 to 5, Qr(X) increases from 60% to about 64%,491
which is close to the empirical bias favoring X. By contrast, under the Catch-Up Rule,492
Qr(X) stays close to 0.500, so it tends to equalize the probabilities that X and Y win.493
There is a small odd-even effect for both rules. Most salient is that after five494
rounds, and with sudden death if the shootout is still unresolved, the Catch-Up Rule495
reduces the Standard Rule’s bias favoring X from 64% to 51%, making the contest496
essentially even-steven, though X kicks first on the first round.497
The Catch-Up Rule can also be modeled as a Markov chain, with its transition498
probability matrix based on the transitions shown in Figure 1. (Such matrices are499
constructed for tennis and baseball in [13, pp. 161–170].) From this matrix one can500
derive the probability that X wins, Y wins, or there is a tie (if there is not sudden501
death), either after a specified number of rounds or in the limit as the number of502
rounds goes to infinity.503
If there is sudden death and, therefore, no possibility of a tie, the limit proba-504
bilities are those we give for X (Y ’s are their complements) in Table 3. Because the505
transitions of the Catch-Up Rule depend on the prior state, it is a Markov process.506
For the Standard Rule and the Catch-Up Rule, we can also calculate, recursively,507
the expected length (EL) in rounds of a penalty shootout with sudden death, which508
is509
EL = [p(1− q) + q(1− p)](1) + [pq + (1− p)(1− q)](1 + EL).510
The two bracketed expressions, multiplied respectively by 1 and (1 +EL), signify the511
following:512
(i) the game ends in one round (X and Y each kick once) when X scores and Y513
does not with probability p(1− q), or Y scores and X does not with probability514
(1− p)q.515
(ii) the game continues to a second round, and possibly beyond, with an expected516
length of (1 + EL), with probability pq (when both players score) plus (1 −517
p)(1− q) (when both players do not score) in the second and possibly additional518
rounds (represented by EL).519
Solving for EL yields520
1
(p+ q − 2pq) .521
For p = 3/4 and q = 2/3, EL = 2.4. Thus, if there is sudden death after five penalty522
kicks, which will occur in more than 25% of games under both the Standard Rule and523
the Catch-Up Rule (see Table 1), the expectation is that it will take about half as524
many more rounds to determine the winner.525
FIFA World Cup matches since 1982 and UEFA European Championship matches526
since 1976 have produced only seven penalty shootouts that were decided by sudden527
death. Five of these lasted one round, one lasted two rounds, and one lasted four528
rounds, giving an average length of 1.57 rounds (for details, see http://www.fifa.com529
and http://www.uefa.com).530
EL does not depend on whether one uses the Standard Rule or the Catch-Up531
Rule. Under the Standard Rule, X kicks first and Y second on every round, whereas532
under the Catch Rule there is typically alternation. But this difference does not533
change the values of p and q, whichever team kicks first or second, in the formula for534
EL.535
So far we have illustrated our results only for p = 3/4 and q = 2/3. In Figure 2,536
we compare Q5(X) and Q5(Y ) using the Catch-Up Rule and the Standard Rule for537
three different pairs of (p, q)—(2/3, 3/5), (3/4, 2/3), and (3/4, 3/5). Observe that538
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Fig. 2. Q5(X) and Q5(Y ) for Standard Rule and Catch-Up Rule for Three Different Pairs of
(p; q)
the Catch-Up Rule comes close to equalizing Q5(X) and Q5(Y ) at 0.50 each, whereas539
the Standard Rule gives X a substantial advantage—Q5(X) averages about 0.65.540
We next ask whether there are any circumstances in which a team would ever541
try not to score a goal, or block a goal, in the penalty shootout. If neither team542
can benefit from deliberately missing a kick or not blocking a kick, we say that the543
rule for determining the order of kicking on each round is incentive compatible or544
strategyproof (for example, see [16] for an informative analysis of strategizing in sports545
competitions).546
The Standard Rule, in which one team shoots first on every round if it wins the547
coin toss, is strategyproof. Because neither team can change the order of shooting,548
each team will always try to make and block as many goals as possible, including549
during sudden death if the score is tied after five rounds.550
In the case of the Catch-Up Rule, can a team, by deliberately missing a kick,551
change the order of kicking on the next round to its advantage?552
Proposition 4.1. The Catch-Up Rule is strategyproof if (p− q) ≤ 1/2.553
Proof. If a team is the first kicker on a round i (say, X ), it will succeed with554
probability p and will have no incentive to deliberately miss. If it is the second kicker555
(Y ), it will succeed with probability q < p, so conceivably it may deliberately miss on556
round i in order that it can kick first in round i + 1, when its probability of scoring557
is higher.558
But if X succeeds on round i, Y, regardless of whether or not it is also successful,559
will always kick first on round i+1 anyway, so there is no reason for Y to deliberately560
miss in this case. Y will also kick first on round i + 1 if X fails and it does so, too,561
by rule 3 of the Catch-Up Rule.562
The only circumstance in which Y will not kick first on round i + 1 is if it tries563
and succeeds on round i after X fails. In this circumstance, Y does better on round564
i (scoring 1 goal), and on round i+ 1 (scoring 1 goal with probability q) than scoring565
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on round i+ 1 with probability p < 1 (because, by deliberately missing on round i, Y566
kicks first on round i+ 1). (Note that if Y tried and and did not succeed on round i,567
it would go first on round i+ 1 and so succeed with probability p.) In sum, by trying568
and succeeding on round i after X fails, Y gains an average of (1 + q) goals, and by569
not trying it gains an average of p goals, so Y ’s net gain from trying and succeeding570
after X fails is (1 + q − p) expected goals.571
As for X, if Y tries and succeeds, it gains an average of p goals on round i+ 1; if572
Y does not try, it gains an average of q goals. This makes X ’s net gain p−q expected573
goals when Y tries and succeeds. Subtracting X ’s net gain from Y ’s net gain yields574
the following net difference in expected goals between X and Y at the end of round575
i+ 1:576
(1 + q − p)− (p− q) = 1− 2(p− q).577
This holds for rounds later than i+ 1, because if Y deliberately misses on round578
i, it definitely goes first on round i + 1. If Y succeeds on round i + 1, which it does579
with probability p, this puts Y in a disadvantageous position on round i+ 2—besides580
its expected score being less at the end of round i+ 1.581
If (p − q) ≤ 1/2, the net difference is positive, and therefore favorable to Y ’s582
trying and succeeding after X fails on round i. In other words, there would be no583
incentive for a player to deliberately miss, when it kicks second on round i, unless its584
ability to score when it kicks first (with probability p) is much, much larger than its585
ability to score when it kicks second (with probability q). An analogous argument586
shows that when a team plays defense, it should always try to block a shot when the587
condition of Proposition 2 is met.588
Because the condition of Proposition 2 seems highly likely to be met, there seems589
almost no circumstance in which Y would not try to score when it kicks second590
in a round. If play goes to sudden death, then by rule 3 of the Catch-Up Rule,591
the order of kicking on each round will alternate, which a player cannot manipulate592
without deliberately losing in sudden death. Hence, while the Catch-Up Rule is not593
strategyproof for all values of p and q, in practice it is probably as invulnerable to594
strategizing as the Standard Rule is.595
5. The Tiebreaker in Tennis. We next extend our analysis to tennis—in par-596
ticular, to the tiebreaker, which is invoked in almost all professional tennis tourna-597
ments when a set is tied at 6-6 in games. The tennis tiebreaker differs from the598
penalty shootout in soccer in not being played in rounds, whereby each team is given599
one chance to score.600
In the tiebreaker, the player who would normally serve after a 6-6 tie in a set601
begins by serving once, followed by the other player then serving twice. Thereafter,602
the two players alternate, each serving twice. We assume the server is the advantaged603
player in tennis.604
The first player to score 7 points, and win by a margin of at least 2 points, wins605
the tiebreaker. Thus, if players tie at 6-6, a score of 7-6 is not winning. In this case,606
the tiebreaker would continue until one player goes ahead by two points (e.g., at 8-6,607
9-7, etc.)608
Assume that X begins by serving for 1 point. If X succeeds, it wins the point;609
otherwise, Y does (unlike in soccer U cannot occur in tennis). Regardless of who610
succeeds, the order of serving is followed by a fixed alternating sequence of double611
serves, Y Y XXY Y XX.... When X starts, the entire sequence can be viewed as one612
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of two alternating single serves, broken by the slashes shown below,613
XY/Y X/XY/Y X...614
where, between each pair of adjacent slashes, the order of X and Y changes as one615
moves from left to right.616
Unlike soccer, we do not attribute any value to serving first or second between617
adjacent slashes, which we call a block. A player is advantaged only from serving, not618
from whether the sequence of the block is XY or YX. Arguably, the tiebreaker creates619
a balance of forces: X is advantaged by serving at the beginning, but Y is then given620
a chance to catch up, and even move ahead, by next having two serves in a row.621
Notice that because 7-6 sums to 13, an odd number, it must occur in the midst of622
a block, because each block adds two points. In fact, that block is XY, which occurs623
on odd blocks 1, 3, 5, ..., so being in the midst of this block puts X one serve ahead.624
When Y serves next to complete the block, it will render the score either 8-6 or 7-7.625
Because these scores sum to an even number (14), each player will have had the626
same number of serves. Thus, if X wins by 8-6, it could not have won only because627
it started first and had more serves than Y.628
From 6-6 on, the rule that a player must win by two points ensures that a player629
can win only by winning twice in a block—when it serves and when its opponent630
serves. If the players split in each block, the tiebreaker continues, because neither631
player will move ahead by two points.632
5.1. Standard Rule and Catch-Up Rule. Let p be the probability that a633
player is successful if it serves in the tiebreaker. Because the order of serving in blocks634
(XY or YX ) does not matter—unlike penalty kicks in soccer, wherein shooting first635
is preferable to shooting second (p > q)—p is the only parameter we need to model636
the tie-breaker in tennis if the players are equally skilled in serving and not serving.637
(An obvious extension of our model would be to assume that this is not the case;638
instead, X and Y ’s skills in serving are given by p and q, respectively, and p 6= q.)639
To illustrate our analysis of the tiebreaker in a simple case, assume that the first640
player to win at least 2 points (instead of 6), by a margin of 2 or more points than its641
opponent, wins the tiebreaker. (Thus, 2-1 is not winning for X, but 2-0 and 3-1 are.)642
If neither player manages this feat because the score after each player serves twice is643
2-2, the tiebreaker goes to sudden death. Then the first player to score 2 points in a644
row—once on its serve and once on its opponent’s serve—wins the tiebreaker.645
Let P 2(X), P 2(Y ), and P 2(T ), be the probabilities, respectively, that X wins646
the tiebreaker, Y wins the tiebreaker, or there is a tie (T ) after each player serves647
a maximum of two times. Assume, as before, that the sequence starts with X—648
XY/YX—but it may terminate early if either X or Y wins the first two points. We649
derive only P 2(X) under the Standard Rule and the Catch-Up Rule, because the650
calculations for P 2(Y ) and P 2(T ) are similar, and follow the same pattern as those651
we showed for the penalty shootout in soccer in Section 3.652
For the Standard Rule—the rule presently used—there is one sequence in which653
X wins at 2-0, and two sequences in which X wins at 3-1: (i) X (serves and) wins,654
and Y loses; (ii) X wins, Y wins, Y loses, and X wins; (iii) X loses, Y loses, Y loses,655
and X wins. The probabilities for these three sequences sum to656
P 2(X) = p(1− p) + p(p)(p)(1− p) + (1− p)(1− p)(p)(1− p)657
658
= 2p(1− p)(1− p+ p2).659
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1 Block 2 Blocks 3 Blocks 4 Blocks 5 Blocks 6 Blocks
P (X) 0.188 0.305 0.356 0.383 0.399 0.409
Standard Rule P (Y ) 0.188 0.305 0.356 0.383 0.399 0.409
P (T ) 0.625 0.391 0.288 0.235 0.203 0.181
P (X) 0.188 0.305 0.354 0.379 0.393 0.404
Catch-Up Rule P (Y ) 0.062 0.133 0.186 0.225 0.253 0.274
P (T ) 0.750 0.563 0.460 0.397 0.354 0.323
Table 4
Probability That X Wins, Y Wins, or There Is a Tie after 1-6 Blocks in a Tennis Tiebreaker
when p = 3/4 for the Standard Rule and the Catch-Up Rule
For the Catch-Up Rule, the winning sequences are: (i) X (serves and) wins, and660
Y loses; (ii) X wins, Y wins, X wins, and Y loses; (iii) X loses, X wins, Y loses,661
and Y loses. The latter sequence reflects the fact that after a player loses, it serves662
again, making the ordering, as in soccer, endogenous rather than exogenous. The663
probabilities for the one 2-0 sequence and the two 3-1 sequences sum to664
P 2(X) = p(1− p) + p(p)(p)(1− p) + (1− p)(p)(1− p)(1− p)665
666
= p(1− p)(2− 2p+ 2p2).667
Unlike the comparable formulas for penalty kicks in soccer after two rounds (see668
Section 3), P 2(X) = P 2(Y ) for the tiebreaker in tennis under the Standard Rule.669
Thus, equally skilled players have the same probability of winning under the Standard670
Rule, the complement of which is the probability of a tie. If p = 2/3, for example,671
P 2(X) = P 2(Y ) = 28/81 = 0.346; P 2(T ) = 25/81 = 0.309.672
But for the Catch-Up Rule, these probabilities differ significantly:673
P 2(X) = 28/81 = 0.346; P 2(Y ) = 17/81 = 0.210; P 2(T ) = 0.444.674
Thus, it is the Standard Rule, not the Catch-Up Rule, that equalizes the probabilities675
that each player wins, at least without sudden death, by at least two points.676
This margin of victory under the Standard Rule ensures that each player serves677
the same number of times. Because p is the same for X and Y, and the order of678
serving does not matter, it follows that the players will have the same probability of679
winning, independent of the winning score.680
In Table 4, we present P r(X), P r(X), and P r(X) for the Standard Rule and the681
Catch-Up Rule in tennis, wherein each block consists of two serves. (We do not include682
the Behind First, Alternating Order Rule, because its effects are similar to those of683
the Catch-Up Rule, which we discuss shortly.) To make these results comparable to684
those for the penalty shootout in soccer (Table 1), we assume p = 3/4, so 1 − p =685
1/4. This is surely an unrealistically low value for the receiver’s winning a point in686
most matches, compared with q = 2/3 in in the penalty shootout in soccer, when687
a team kicks second. But we use it only to illustrate how the probabilities of each688
player’s winning or tying, before sudden death, change as the number of blocks in the689
tiebreaker increases.690
For the Standard Rule, as this maximum number increases, the probability of a691
tie, and having to go to sudden death, declines rapidly, going from 63% (1 block) to692
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1 Block 2 Blocks 3 Blocks 4 Blocks 5 Blocks 6 Blocks
Standard Rule Q(X) 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Catch-Up Rule Q(X) 0.600 0.600 0.590 0.580 0.573 0.566
Table 5
Probability That X Wins, with Sudden Death, after 1-6 Blocks in a Tennis Tiebreaker when p
= 3/4 for the Standard Rule and the Catch-Up Rule
18% (6 blocks). For the Catch-Up Rule, the percentage decline is almost the same,693
going from 75% (1 block) to 32% (6 blocks).694
The Catch-Up Rule is decidedly unfair, favoring X by a ratio of 0.404/0.274 =695
1.474 when the players have a maximum of six serves each. This gives X almost a696
50% greater probability of winning before sudden death, whereas the Standard Rule697
equalizes P r(X) and P r(Y ) for all r.698
As we show in Table 5, incorporating sudden death into these probabilities reduces699
the bias of the Catch-Up Rule but does not eliminate it. At six blocks, X is favored700
over Y by a ratio of 0.566/0.434 = 1.152, but this still gives X more than a 15%701
advantage over Y, compared with the Standard Rule’s complete elimination of bias.702
The Standard Rule for tennis, like the Standard Rule for soccer, is predetermined.703
In tennis, it fixes the order of serving, the number of serves of each player, and the704
winning score in the tiebreaker, just as the Standard Rule in soccer fixes the order of705
kicking and the number of rounds in the penalty shootout.706
The Catch-Up Rule in both sports, by contrast, makes who serves and who kicks,707
and when, dependent on how each side performed previously. What is striking is that708
it is the Catch-Up Rule in soccer that tends to level the playing field, whereas it is709
the Standard Rule in tennis that does so—in fact, the Standard Rule equalizes the710
probability that each player wins the tiebreaker in tennis.711
Up to five kicks by each team in soccer, and up to six serves by each player in712
tennis, seem to have been chosen to give the superior team a higher probability of713
winning after a tie. They surely do, instead of going to sudden death immediately, if714
one side is indeed superior.715
Before tiebreakers for sets were introduced into tennis in the 1970s, it was shown716
[13] how the effect of being more skilled in winning a point in tennis ramified to a717
game, a set, and a match. For example, a player with a probability of 0.51 (0.60)718
of winning a point—whether it served or not—had a probability of 0.525 (0.736) of719
winning a game, a probability of 0.573 (0.966) of winning a set, and a probability of720
0.635 (0.9996) of winning a match (the first player to win three sets). In tennis, to win721
a game or a set requires, respectively, winning by at least two points or at least two722
games (if there is no tiebreaker). In effect, tiebreakers change the margin by which a723
player must win a set from at least two games in a set to at least two points in the724
tiebreaker.725
But if each side is equally skilled, the question is whether the Standard Rule in726
each sport gives each side the same chance of winning. Our analysis shows that this is727
in fact the case in the tennis tiebreaker, whereas the Catch-Up Rule and the Behind728
First, Alternating Order Rule work better in the penalty shootout of soccer. (We729
prefer the Catch-Up Rule because it is simpler, dependent only on the performance730
of the teams on the previous round.) Can other sports or games benefit from the731
Catch-Up Rule, or the Standard Rule that includes a Win-by-Two Rule?732
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6. Fairer Rules for Sports and Games. Many sports require the winner to be733
the first player or team to win a certain number of points. For example, in badminton734
and squash, the first player to score 21 and 11 points, respectively, and win by a735
margin of at least two points if there is a tie at 20 each in badminton or 10 each in736
squash, wins a game. In each of these sports, points are awarded to whoever wins,737
whether that player is the server or not.738
This is not true in another sport, racquetball, in which the winning score is739
15 points by a margin of one. In racquetball, only the server wins a point when740
it serves successfully (if it fails, the nonserver becomes the new server, as is true741
in badminton and squash), which was formerly the case in badminton, squash, and742
volleyball. Barrow [3, p. 103] indicates that this caused problems by lengthening743
games and hence discouraging TV coverage. The rule in racquetball that only the744
server can win a point is similar to the penalty shootout in soccer, wherein only745
the kicker can score a point. However, unlike soccer, the server in racquetball, if746
successful, continues to serve, whereas in the penalty shootout there are rounds, in747
which each team has the opportunity to kick. In all three racquet sports, the server748
is considered to be advantaged.749
But in a nonracquet sport, volleyball, wherein the winning score is usually 25750
points by a margin of at least two and scoring is the same as it is in badminton and751
squash, it is the nonserving team that is advantaged [17]. This is because the serving752
team does not usually win a point on its serve alone; instead, the nonserving team753
uses the serve to set up an attack, in which it is often able to win with a spike that754
cannot be returned.755
In all these sports in which the first team to score a certain number of points756
wins, one might think that the Win-by-Two Rule in each would, as in the tennis757
tiebreaker, make them fair. But unlike tennis, wherein both players always serve the758
same number of times in the tiebreaker, this is not in general true in badminton,759
squash, racquetball, and volleyball. The player who serves more in the three racquet760
sports will enjoy an advantage, whereas the team that serves less in volleyball will761
gain this advantage.762
The Catch-Up Rule can be applied to these sports in the following manner: When-763
ever the advantaged player or team wins a point (as the server in badminton, squash764
and racquetball; as the receiver in volleyball), the other player or team becomes ad-765
vantaged on the next point (by serving in the three racquet sports, by receiving in766
volleyball). If the players or teams are equally skilled, this will make for frequent767
switches of servers and will tend to equalize the number of times each side serves and768
does not serve.769
If the players are not equally skilled, the Catch-Up Rule and the Behind First,770
Alternating Order Rule, compared to the Standard Rule, give a break to less skilled771
players, who become advantaged more often and therefore win more frequently. This772
makes competition among all players keener, which may make competition in a league773
or tournament more suspenseful. However, by helping the weaker players, these rules774
diminish the superiority of the stronger players, which might be desirable, as with775
handicapping, for enhancing competition but not for singling out the players who776
most deserve to win. However, Brams et al. [4] show that the Catch-Up Rule does777
not change the probability of that a player wins in racquet sports and volleyball,778
compared to the Standard Rule, but it does increase the expected length of a game779
and thereby makes it more competitive.780
However, as the Catch-Up Rule in the tennis tiebreaker demonstrates, it would781
not completely eliminate the bias that favors the advantaged player or team that,782
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based on a coin toss, goes first. This is the server in the three racquet sports and the783
nonserver in volleyball, but the bias is reduced the higher the score needed to win is784
(in Table 4, notice how Q1(X) decreases as r increases for the Catch-Up Rule).785
It would be fairer to use a sequence like that for tennis,786
XY/Y X/XY/Y X...787
but there are other alternating sequences that also create adjacent XY or YX blocks.788
For example, the strict alternation sequence,789
XY/XY/XY/XY...790
or the balanced alternation (Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence), which Brams and Taylor791
[6] refer to as “taking turns taking turns taking turns ...,”792
XY/Y X/Y X/XY...793
are fair for the same reason that the tennis sequence, coupled with the Win-by-Two794
Rule, is fair—the players are advantaged the same number of times (see Section 5).795
However, if a block is thought of as a round, and one team benefits from always going796
first in the round (as in the penalty shootout in soccer), then the alternating sequence797
is definitely not fair.798
Notice that the tennis sequence maximizes the number of double repetitions when799
written as X/Y Y/XX/Y Y/X..., because after the first serve by one player, there are800
alternating double serves by each player. This minimizes changeover time and thus801
the “jerkiness” of switching serves.802
Palacios-Huerta [15, p. 84] reports an experiment with professional players from803
La Liga (Spain), in which the first kicking team won 61% of the time when the Stan-804
dard Rule of tennis was employed. However, under strict and balanced alternation,805
the bias dropped to 54% and 51%, respectively.806
Game of intellect, including chess, would be fairer using the tiebreaker rule in807
tennis. In chess, it is well known that playing the white pieces, and therefore moving808
first, gives a player an advantage. However, in chess tournaments, it is not always809
possible to ensure that all competitors play white and black pieces equally. Even if it810
is, rising to the top of a tournament often occurs by drawing most games and winning811
a few. Does a slight lead in wins provide conclusive evidence of who should win?812
More confounding, Gonza´lez-Dı´az and Palacios-Huerta [10, p. 46] found that the813
player who plays the first game of a chess match with white pieces wins 57% of the814
time in a dataset of all expert chess matches between 1970 and 2010. This percentage815
rises to 62% when only matches between elite players (with an ELO rating above816
2600) are considered, providing support for the authors’ hypothesis that differences817
tend to be magnified—in the case of chess, starting with white—the more similar the818
cognitive levels of the players are.819
Is it fair that starting with white, perhaps determined by a coin toss, should count820
for so much? It would seem fairer to use the Standard Rule of the tennis tiebreaker,821
letting the player who plays black in the first game play white for the next two games,822
in order to try reduce the first player’s advantage.823
7. Conclusions. To summarize, we have analyzed the rules of two sports, soccer824
and tennis, in detail, but only at the tiebreaking phase. We showed that the Catch-825
Up Rule is fairer than the Standard Rule in the penalty shootout of soccer, and in826
practice it is essentially invulnerable to strategizing. But the Standard Rule is fairer827
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than the Catch-Up Rule in the tennis tiebreaker. (We do not include the Behind828
First, Alternating Order Rule in the comparisons discussed in this section because,829
as noted earlier, its effects are similar to those of the Catch-Up Rule, but it is more830
complex and hence seems less likely to be implemented.)831
For the four other sports (badminton, squash, racquetball, and volleyball) that832
we briefly considered in this section, the present rules do not equalize the probability833
that equally skilled players or teams will win, primarily because they do not ensure834
that each side is advantaged the same number of times. The tennis rule, or some other835
rule in which there are alternating blocks of XY and YX, would do exactly that, but836
are they practicable?837
There is little doubt that suspense is created, which renders play more exciting,838
by making who serves next dependent on the success or failure of the server—rather839
than fixing in advance who serves, and when, with one of the alternating rules. (For840
an illuminating analysis of suspense and surprise in difficult-to-predict situations,841
including outcomes in sports and games, see [9].) Moreover, the Win-by-Two Rule842
makes who ultimately wins less a matter luck and more a matter of skill, but it does843
not eliminate entirely the bias favoring the advantaged player who serves first.844
But a sport can generate keen competition, as the tennis tiebreaker does, without845
leaving uncertain who will be the server during the competition. To be sure, it is one846
thing to break a tied set in tennis, which is not usually how most sets are resolved,847
and another to use it in every game played in the three other racquet sports and848
volleyball.849
Of all the sports we have discussed, soccer, we think, is the sport that most850
needs reform. There is little excuse to continue to use the Standard Rule in penalty851
shootouts, which both in theory and practice gives the first kicker on every round a852
substantial advantage. Either the Catch-Up Rule, or the tennis tiebreaker or another853
alternation rule, seems justified and easy to implement.854
We qualify this statement by pointing out that complete fairness will not be855
achieved unless there is an even number of penalty kicks (say, four or six), enabling856
each team to kick first in half of them. Even though the tennis rule completely857
eliminates the bias in the tiebreaker, it does not do so in the penalty shootout partly858
because of the odd number of kicks of each team. Both the Catch-Up Rule and the859
Behind First, Alternating Order Rule would require an even number of penalty kicks860
to make it possible that each side kicks first in half of them.861
To conclude, we have said nothing about the rules of major professional sports like862
American football, baseball, basketball, and hockey. In these, a team is significantly863
advantaged, especially in basketball, by playing games at home rather than away.864
But it would be logistically difficult, if not impossible, quickly to switch venues, based865
on the Catch-Up Rule, when teams’ home locations might be separated by 3,000866
miles. Also impeding quick switches are that fans need advance notice of games, and867
broadcast networks need considerable setup time.868
But when the competitors are all in one place, such as in tournaments where869
games (e.g., chess) and sports (e.g., tennis) are often played, this is not a problem.870
We think it is appropriate to consider rule changes that foster greater fairness in these871
competitions as well as in sports, including those we have discussed, in which there872
are multiple, repeated contests that determine the outcome of a game.873
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